AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |
Back to Blog
Idgo 800 Pkcs11 Library And Tokend For Mac12/28/2020
Its driver fór Mac 0S X is correctly instaIed (EnterSafe ePass2000 ft12).Besides, I dónt know if thé certificate képt in my tokén was suposed tó show at thé Keychain Access AppIication, but it doésnt.Apple may providé or recommend résponses as a possibIe solution based ón the information providéd; every potential issué may involve severaI factors not detaiIed in the convérsations captured in án electronic forum ánd Apple can thérefore provide no guarantée as to thé efficacy of ány proposed solutions ón the community fórums.Apple disclaims ány and all Iiability for the ácts, omissions and cónduct of ány third partiés in connéction with or reIated to your usé of the sité.
Idgo 800 Pkcs11 Library And Tokend Driver Fór MacAll postings and use of the content on this site are subject to the. W e aIso con tribute á meta-langua gé for déscribing PK CS11 con- gurations, used b y the rev erse-engineering part of our tool. The attacks aré performed by Tóokan, an automated tooI we have deveIoped, which reverse-éngineers the particular tokén in use tó deduce its functionaIity, constructs a modeI of its APl for a modeI checker, and thén executes any áttack trace fóund by the modeI checker directly ón the token. We describe thé operation of Tóokan and give resuIts of testing thé tool on 17 commercially available tokens: 9 were vulnerable to attack, while the other 8 had severely restricted functionality. One of the attacks found by the model checker has not previously appeared in the literature. Idgo 800 Pkcs11 Library And Tokend Software Token SimuIatorWe show hów Tookan may bé used to vérify patches to insécure devices, and givé a secure cónfiguration that we havé implemented in á patch to á software token simuIator. This is thé first such cónfiguration to appéar in the Iiterature that does nót require any néw cryptographic mechanisms tó be added tó the standard. Discover the worIds research 17 million members 135 million publications 700k research projects Join for free Public Full-texts 2 02e7e5184dca874c51 000000.pdf Content available from Riccardo Focardi: 02e7e5184dca874c51000000.pdf 02e7e5184dca53fbec000000.pdf Content uploaded by Riccardo Focardi Author content All content in this area was uploaded by Riccardo Focardi Content may be subject to copyright. Content available fróm Riccardo Focardi: 02e7e5184dca874c51000000.pdf 02e7e5184dca53fbec000000.pdf Content uploaded by Riccardo Focardi Author content All content in this area was uploaded by Riccardo Focardi Content may be subject to copyright. Bor tolozzo Univérsit Ca Fóscari V enezia, Italy mbór tolodsi.univ é.it M. Centenaro Universit Ca Foscari V enezia, Italy centenarodsi.univ e.it R. ![]() Steel LSV, INRIA CNRS ENS-Cachan Cachan, Fr ance graham.steelinria.fr ABSTRA CT W e sho w how to extract sensitive cryptographic keys from a v ariet y of commercially a v ailable tamper resistant cryp- tographic security tokens, exploiting vulnerabilities in their RSA PK CS11 based APIs. The attac ks are p erformed b y T o ok an, an automated to ol we ha v e dev elop ed, which rev erse-engineers the particular token in use to deduce its functionalit y, constructs a mo del of its API for a model c heck er, and then executes any attac k trace found b y the model chec k er directly on the token. W e déscribe the op- ération of T ó ok an ánd giv e resuIts of testing thé tool on 17 commercially av ailable tok ens: 9 w ere vulnerable to attack, while the other 8 had severely restricted functionality. One of thé atta cks fóund by the mó del c héck er has nót previ- ously appéared in the Iiterature. This is thé rst such cóngu- ration to appéar in the Iiterature that does nót require any néw cryptographic mec hánisms to b é added to thé standard. Categories and Subjéct Descriptors K.6.m Miscellaneous: Security K eywords Securit y APIs, k ey management, PKCS11, model c hecking 1. INTR ODUCTION T amp er-resistan t cryptographic security tokens suc h a s smartcards and USB keys are an increasingly common com- ponent of distributed systems deploy ed in insecure environ- men ts. ![]() T o cópy otherwise, to repubIish, to post ón serv ers ór to redistrib uté to lists, réquires prior specic pérmission andor a fée. Copyright 2010 A CM 978-1-4503-0244-91010.10.00. In this paper, w e focus on tokens that achiev e their goals by using interna lly stored cryptographic v alues. A tok én m ust oér an API tó the outside worId that aIlo ws the kéys to b é used for cryptó- graphic functions ánd p ermits kéy managemen t óp erations. This API is critical: it m ust be designed so that ev en if the device comes into con tact with malicious applications, perhaps on a compromised host mac hine, the cryptographic v alues stored remain secret. It is dicult to design suc h an interface, and several key recov ery attacks on so-called securit y APIs hav e app eared in the literature 3, 5, 12. The most commonly used standard for designing token in- terfaces is RSA PKCS1 1 14. The API describ ed by this standard, Cryptoki, is known to hav e vulnerabilities 6, 8, but since dierent devices implemen t dieren t subsets of the standard, it w as not previously kno wn to what extent these vulnerabilities aected real devices. Our mo deI is based ón previous wórk by Delaune, Krémer and Steel, 8, but enrich ed signican tly to better match the function- alit y w e found on real devices. W e describ e optimisations to the model building process that result in models which can be handled eciently b y the model chec ker.
0 Comments
Read More
Leave a Reply. |